Elite and Specialized Interviewing (ISBN: 9780954796679)
Lewis Anthony Dexter


Individualism (ISBN: 9780954796662) Steven Lukes


Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition (ISBN: 9780955820342) Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Farlie


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The ideas and arguments in this book date back to the day in February 1989 when a death threat was pronounced on the British Commonwealth writer Salman Rushdie while I was working at a multi-ethnic inner city school in France; editing was nearing completion the day that European election results announced huge successes for the United Kingdom Independence Party and the French National Front in May 2014. Between these dates and events, questions concerning Islam, multiculturalism, new migrations and free movement in an integrating Europe, have fallen and risen on the political agenda. But throughout there has been precious little clear conceptual or theoretical understanding in public debates – and also much academic scholarship – about the deep problems involved in our routine understandings of these subjects. Much public discussion is stuck with inappropriate conceptions of migration, integration and diversity, as well as naive sociologies of how economy and society in a regional and global society now work. To hear some politicians in Europe talk, it is as if we are still living through a late nineteenth century period of nation-state building, anchored in romantic, homogeneous, ethnic conceptions of nationhood and citizenship. Yet many of these same conceptions are reproduced unquestioned by academic scholarship, in a sub-field of social science that has burgeoned dramatically over the past twenty-five years while often gaining little depth.

I have always tried to position my work at the edges of the field of ethnic and racial studies or migration studies: as a problematiser of paradigms, or conceptual trouble maker for those engaged in the honourable, but sometimes wrongheaded business of ‘normal science’ in this field – whether qualitative or quantitative. The essays collected in this book thus represent both my fascination and frustration with the massive growth of the field of migration studies, and our notions of immigration, integration and mobility as dominant concerns of our times. I still believe that re-examining these notions and the research that has been structured by them, can key us into some of the most puzzling paradoxes of the modern nation-state, regional integration and globalisation. But as the feeble impact on everyday political debate of so much research shows, migration studies has been able to boom without necessarily accumulating wisdom. As I argue insistently in this book, the international migration studies we have inherited is a necessarily interdisciplinary field. Yet it is squeezed and debilitated by disciplinary divisions caused by reductive research assessment and impact factor pressures; even free of these, there is still precious little talk across disciplines or understanding across national political contexts.

Another migration studies is nevertheless possible. The essays in Immigration, Integration and Mobility seek to explore the fluid possibilities of a field which is uniquely well positioned to chart the landscape of a social science beyond container nation-state-societies; in which interdisciplinarity and multiple methods
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can be used to engineer a non-methodologically nationalist social science incorporating methods and conceptions, not only from sociology and political science, but just as much from geography and anthropology, as well as economics and demography. The search for policy relevant research also calls for engagement with normative political theory and ethics, which again may question the normal relations of knowledge between the state and social science. At the same time, we have to migrate with our methods and our minds to get out of nation-centred local perspectives, as much as the routine fallacies of disciplinary codes: learning how to be aware of commonalities as well as distinctions across countries, and how to juxtapose but not collapse regions of the world, as we search for the necessary comparative models of explanation and understanding.

It is easy to forget that migration studies as a field was very little developed when – after my year of teaching young maghrèbin students in a French collège – I was doing my PhD work at the European University Institute, Florence in the early 1990s. In Western Europe, research on immigration or ethnicity was mostly bounded by very national political concerns in local political contexts with little attempt at productive comparison. Debates in Britain, for example, were dominated by a ‘race relations’ paradigm, peculiar to its national politics, which had been ascendant since the 1960s. Migration was believed to have stopped in the 1970s; the narrative stressed the difficult emergence of a multi-racial society cast in the colours and cultures specific to Britain’s immigrant populations; and other European experiences with immigration were seen as backwards. Stepping outside of this frame, and influenced decisively by the ambitions of American comparative historical sociology and comparative politics, my earliest work thus sought to operationalise a better comparison between the political philosophies underpinning immigration and the idea of citizenship in two central European cases, Britain and France. It sought, in other words, to develop an analytical language, both explanatory and normative, to detox discussions from these ideological distortions and pervasive langues de bois (wooden languages).

The essays in this book reflect this starting point and where it led me, roaming recklessly across disciplines and national borders over the years. Developing on from the initial comparison of two classic immigration nations, it deals in turn with the return of ‘integration’ as the central conceptual logic of contemporary immigration in European nation-states; the rise of dramatic and diverse ‘new migrations’ across all of Europe from the 1990s onwards; the conceptual adaptations needed with the diversification of high-end to middling skilled and professional migration in a global context; and the metamorphosis of migration in Europe as European integration created new kinds of meaning and potentialities for new mobilities in the continent. Accordingly, the essays reflect four central concerns, partly paralleled by the four-part division of the book, which also shadow the chronological development of my post-PhD thinking from 1998 to 2014. They are bookended by my two most systematic programmatic recent statements about the field of study.

A first central concern is the interlacing of normative and explanatory issues in the study of immigration politics. In particular, I develop a distinctively European counterpoint to the liberal political theory developed by Will Kymlicka and others
about North American issues, also insisting upon difficult methodological issues of interpretation and contextualisation often avoided by philosophers. The second insists upon the problem itself of comparison, across nation-state-societies whose ideological narratives and self-perceptions can never be entirely flattened into straight institutional comparison of law and policies, as so much research does. Straight comparisons are flawed by issues of power and asymmetry across cases, which requires sensitivity to interpretative comparatism (in the literary studies sense), as well as some emphasis on how knowledge and categories concerning migrants, culture, race and ethnicity have been internally constructed by policy intellectuals and academics differently in different countries. A third concern, then, is with category change, particularly as rising awareness of the effects of globalisation and the post-industrial shift lead to a new emphasis on (i.e.) ‘transnationalism’, ‘mobilities’ and ‘super-diversity’ in migration research, pointing to the expiry of exclusively nation-centred models of citizenship, integration, territory and container-like borders. Linked to this also are concerns with understanding the complex continuum of international migrations and mobilities between traditional low-skilled labour migration and atypical highly-skilled and middling migrations. Fourthly and finally, all these essays display my concern with issues of empirical and normative operationalisation. I was raised as a philosopher and theorist, but I can never escape my deep dissatisfaction with both the ‘clean hands’ abstractness of political philosophy (even when applied), as much as the sweeping exaggerations of most macro-level ‘global’ social theory. Part of this is my solid rejection of post-humanist (post-modern) trends in critical theory. Migration studies, indeed, as a distinctively agent- (or) human- centred field of research, is uniquely well equipped – via its grounded narratives of the lives and experiences of real migrants – to temper the excesses of the armchair theorists and go well beyond generalisations based only on seminar room debate, discourse analysis or sweeping macro-structural data.

Structure of the volume

The structure of this volume is built on four distinct parts in which two essays are chosen to represent and, as far as possible, exhaustively cover my views on each of these respective areas. The parts are introduced and concluded by two of my most broad and encompassing views of the field. The essays have been thoroughly revised and updated, along with a systematically compiled bibliography and references that reflect the full range of migration studies and my reading during the past twenty-five years.

The introductory essay, *Immigration, migration and free movement in the making of Europe* (2008) represents my most encompassing synthetic view of the question of migration in Europe. With a historical sweep, it identifies the normality of migration and mobility in the history of Europe – that is, against the myth of nationalist immobility – and points out how migration in the post-1990 period has dramatically diversified in terms of classic non-European immigrations, new intra-European migrations (i.e. East-West movements), and new forms of internal European mobility linked to European integration.
Part One, Applied Political Philosophy: The Problem of Multicultural Citizenship, develops and extends the arguments of my PhD and first book (Favell 1998a/2001). I have selected two pieces which best illustrate the problématique of applying political philosophy to the empirical and comparative institutional analysis of immigration policies/citizenship in Western Europe. The first, Multicultural citizenship in theory and practice: applied political philosophy in empirical analyses (1998), is a systematic exploration of the weaknesses of existing ‘applied’ political philosophy on these subjects, and a presentation of institutionalist tools that can be used to do a normative political analysis of citizenship and integration in France and Britain less distorted by North American concerns. The second, Multicultural race relations in Britain: problems of interpretation and explanation (1998), is concerned with how a classic distinction in the philosophy of social science – of explanation versus interpretation – could be applied to better understanding the socially conservative, classic liberal compromise of British ‘race relations’ based on ethnic diversity and religious tolerance.

Part Two, The Question of Integration, reflects how, post-Philosophies of Integration, I developed a broader comparative view of the resurgent question of ‘integration’: the central conceptualisation adopted by European nation-states to discuss how they have responded to the challenges of immigration in the post-war period. Part of this, was the necessary discussion of how dominant European conceptions relate – albeit asymmetrically – to American debates on assimilation, which still largely structure scientific and policy related studies of immigrant trajectories in the USA. The first, Assimilation/Integration (2005), is a short, encyclopaedia-type essay on the complicated relation of concepts in this field. The second, Integration policy and integration research in Europe: a review and critique (2001), is a long and systematic discussion – drawing on a Bourdieusian-style sociology of knowledge – of how integration research and integration policy has been shaped differently by normative and scientific research in distinct European contexts. It provides a model for the sophisticated version of comparatism I argue is necessary to get beyond both the methodological nationalism of most nation-centred policy research, as well as the distorting flattening produced by quantitative-only comparisons that take no heed of interpretative differences across countries.

In Part Three, Highly Skilled Migration and Social Mobility, I move into an agenda responding to the ascendency in the 1990s and early 2000s of large-scale macro debates on globalisation, and the associated popularity of concepts such as ‘transnationalism’ and ‘mobilities’. Migration scholars often enthusiastically underlined the suggestion that the old nation-state was in decline, with international migrations the vanguard of new, non-spatial social formations, across borders, if not across the planet. While sympathetic to this search, my work in this area has always sought to question and delimit the extent of successful transnationalism or mobilities beyond the nation-state, often using a research strategy that focuses empirically on the most likely candidates for transnational lifestyles: high flying mobile ‘elites’. Empirical research, such as my second solo-authored book (Favell 2008a), indeed often reveals the fragile stability of such transnational forms
of life, versus the ever present pressures of nation-centred social integration, for different categories of migrants and movers in Europe. The first essay, *The human face of global mobility: a research agenda* (2006), presents an agenda developed with Miriam Feldblum and Michael Peter Smith, from the research project based at UCLA and the later book on *The Human Face of Global Mobility* (2006). We make a programmatic case for the closer look at so-called ‘elites’, and the delineation of distinct forms of middling migration, barriers to highly skilled international migration, and the extension of varied forms such as the migration of students, nurses, service-sector engineers, and free-moving professionals. In the second, *Social mobility and spatial mobility* (2011) – the first extension of my work in *Eurostars and Eurocities* presented here – I develop with my long-time European research partner, Ettore Recchi, a mixed quantitative/qualitative strategy for exploring how new forms of spatial mobility in the continent might be related to classic concerns of social mobility and change in Europe.

Part Four, New Migration and Mobilities in Europe, reflects further an agenda proposing systematic empirical sociological strategies for studying the bottom-up impact of European integration on migration and mobility in the continent. With Guiraudon and others, I have argued elsewhere (Favell and Guiraudon 2009) that a true sociology of Europeanisation must be clearly distinguished from the top-down legal/institutional/policy conceptions of Europeanisation dominated by political scientists. In the first essay here, *The new face of East-West migration in Europe* (2008), I offer a comparative framework for research on the new East-West migration in Europe after the enlargements of 2004/2008, a topic which has moved to the centre of the political agenda about the future of Europe. This agenda is shot through with misconceptions about ‘immigration’, ‘neo-liberalism’ and ‘free movement’ which I seek to diagnose in the second piece, *The fourth freedom: theories of migration and mobilities in “neo-liberal” Europe* (2014).

As a conclusion, I return to the concluding essay from Brettell and Hollifield’s (2007) handbook for the field. I point out the problematic cross-Atlantic and global asymmetries which dog this effort, the missing interdisciplinary dialogues, as well as the pervasive problem of methodological nationalism in the field. Seeking to ‘reboot’ the field, I argue for how migration studies may be able to develop a genuinely post-disciplinary, global agenda by focusing more on atypical forms of migration and mobility that indicate the limitations of the traditional nation-centred immigration paradigm.

Re-editing a series of past essays, there is an inevitable feeling of autobiography and introspection. As I have joked in keynote talks a couple of times, I feel that revisiting my old essays is a bit like embarking on a Greatest Hits tour as an ageing new wave band from the 1980s. I have, however, over the years been frequently asked when I would come back to my past contributions and reflect upon their relation to emerging and evolving debates that I have, perhaps, in part, influenced. I hope and trust that the intent and substance of these ten essays are still relevant,
and that my updates, additions and new connections are pertinent. I am sure, though, that more reflection on the problems and possibilities of the field is still sorely needed.

I continue to owe great thanks to all the numerous colleagues and friends over the years who have helped my work. While repeating the specific thanks mentioned in my previous publications and in the footnotes here throughout, I would particularly like to thank the editors of this series Dario Castiglione and Alexandra Segerberg for the opportunity to publish in the ECPR series. I have also made the references as comprehensive as possible to indicate my full range of intellectual debts and influences, something that becomes obvious scrolling down the (very long) list. The book was compiled and edited while I was the 2014 Alliance Programme Visiting Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, New York; for this, my thanks to programme director, Alessia Lefebure, Department chair, Yinon Cohen, and Victoria de Grazia, Chris Hill and Emmanuelle Saada, at the Blinken European Institute. Also, un grand merci to all my colleagues at the Centre d’études européennes (CEE) and the Department of Sociology, Sciences Po, Paris, for their continued support and encouragement for my work.

Adrian Favell
November 2014
Chapter One

Introduction – Immigration, Migration and Free Movement in the Making of Europe

Europe historically has been made, unmade, and remade through the movements of peoples.\(^1\) Despite the present day view of Europeans as a rather sedentary and socially immobile population – particularly when compared to the highly mobile spatial and social patterns of North Americans – contemporary Europe has essentially emerged out of a crucible of local, regional, and international population movements over the centuries.

In this introductory chapter, I consider the crucial impact of migration in Europe on European identity, by building a bridge between historical analyses of the phenomenon and emerging patterns that are shaping Europe as a distinctive new regional space of migration and mobility. My aim is to point out how migration is making and remaking Europe, less at the level of ‘identity’ in people’s heads – in fact, if anything, most migrations are contributing to the growth of anti-European sentiment – but more in a territorial and (especially) structural economic sense. This is less easy to see if a purely cultural view is taken of the question of Europe. After sketching the role of population movements in the making and unmaking of Europe historically, I explore in depth the three kinds of migration/mobility that are most salient to the continent today and its structural transformation: first, the ongoing, traditional ‘ethnic’ immigration of non-Europeans into European nation-states; second, the small, but symbolically important emergence of new intra-European ‘elite’ migrations, engaged by European citizens enjoying the fruits of their European Union (EU) free movement rights; and third, the politically ambiguous flows of East-West migrants – which fall somewhere between the other two forms – that have been connected to the EU enlargement processes formalised in 2004 and 2007. The distinctiveness of Europe as a world region – hence in this sense, its economic and territorial identity – can best be grasped by briefly comparing it again to the United States of America (USA) as a similar, but differently structured regional migration space, a theme I turn to in my conclusion.

\(^1\) Originally published in Jeffrey Checkel and Peter Katzenstein (eds) *European Identity*, Cambridge University Press (2008), 167–89. Republished with permission. Translated as ‘Immigration, migration et libre circulation dans la construction de l’Europe’, *Politique Européenne*, no.31 (2010), 33–64. It is also the text of my inaugural lecture as Professor of European and International Studies at Aarhus University, Denmark in November 2008. With thanks to the editors and contributors of this volume, in particular Thomas Risse, for useful comments and criticisms in its development, and to Nauja Kleist and Jan Ifversen for their invitation to lecture on this subject.
Population movements in the making and unmaking of Europe

It is not uncommon to picture European nationals as somehow innately predisposed to not move. Europe is typically seen as a patchwork of ‘thick’ inherited cultures – divided up by proudly preserved languages and social practices – that map out a continent of stubbornly rooted peoples with strong national and local identities, not much affected by the efforts of European institutions – or globalisation – to get them to think differently. It is also seen as a continent largely hostile to new immigrants, struggling to integrate even the small numbers of ethnically and racially distinct minorities that do manage to get in. The USA, as is so often the case, is often referred to in order to underline this contrast. If the EU can be thought of for a moment as a kind of federal United States of Europe, the numbers are stark. While around 12 per cent of Americans are foreign born (Batalova and Lowell 2006), less than one in fifty Europeans live outside his/her state of national birth; and even intra-regional migration within European nation-states is lower than cross-state migration in the USA, at 22 per cent compared to 33 per cent (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2006). European society is thus seen as the product of historically rooted cultures; America unequivocally has been built on immigration and the melting pot of newcomers. Despite fluctuating political resistance to new immigration, the base numbers and percentages moving to the USA are still bigger than anywhere in Europe, as is the sheer size of recent immigrant-origin populations over two or three generations – which in some states such as California now exceed 50 per cent. The attractiveness of the USA for new generations of the internationally ambitious and talented is still unanswered by Europe as a global economic force: two-thirds of tertiary-educated migrants from developing countries choose America as their destination, with dramatically beneficial consequences for the American economy (Peri 2005). It appears, in short, that Americans are willing to move and accept movers; Europeans are not.

A short pause for thought on this assumption will quickly reveal its historical ineptitude (see also Recchi 2006). America, after all, was largely populated by Europeans who moved and moved again: over sea, and then over great stretches of land. Thought of less shortsightedly, Europe is and always has been a continent of migratory flux. Early modern Europe – the kind of Europe celebrated by nationalists everywhere in terms of culturally rooted folklore (Hobsbawm 1983; Anderson 1991) – in fact was already a patchwork of circular, seasonal, and career mobility well before industrialisation. These revolutions then changed everything: sweeping peasants off the land, ripping apart rural communities, packing expansive cities full of new social classes, and creating economic channels of mobility that linked all of Europe, and eventually the world, in a new system of empire and capital (Hobsbawm 1987; Bade 2000; Moch 2003). On the ground, this meant continual flows of migration. By the late nineteenth century, unprecedented numbers were also moving across national borders as worker populations, and across seas as new world migrants and settlers (Hatton and Williamson 1998). Europeans went everywhere.
Why this is forgotten in the image of a sedentary Europe today is, of course, that the wars of the twentieth century stopped much of this migration. Nation-states finally reigned supreme as the dominant form of global social organisation: cementing the institutionalised role of state-centred power as explosive population containers, using military service, citizenship, and welfare rights in the name of national identity, to build political distinctions between insiders and outsiders and fix people spatially (Mann 1993; Torpey 2000). This, then, became the familiar, legitimate political topography of the modern world, leaving numerous ethnic groups on the wrong side of territorial borders or in despised social locations, the stateless residual populations of a now thoroughly nationalised Europe. This left one disaster – the Jewish holocaust – which scarred the continent forever, and an ugly aftermath of war that brutally shifted yet more populations, East and West. Europeans were once again moved, in search of a stable political solution that might for once and for all settle the ethnic and ideological frontiers of the so-called ‘shatter zone’ in Central and East Europe (Brubaker 1995; Mazower 1998; Mann 2005). Europe gave up its empires, and the Iron Curtain created a new, nearly impermeable material and psychological barrier, freezing East-West mobility and literally severing the latitudinal land movements and interactions that had, in longue durée geographical terms, been the greatest civilising resource of the continent (Diamond 1997).

In the West, generous welfare state structures in the postwar period – a kind of liberal democratic form of socialised nationalism prevalent throughout the continent up to 1970 (Mazower 1998) – cemented national populations in place like never before. The shrunken West European powers eventually re-emerged economically, but they did so by now servicing their migrant worker needs, first via a new wave of migrants from the peripheral South to North (from Italy, Spain, Portugal and Yugoslavia), then – as these movements too dried up – via a large, hitherto unprecedented immigration from former colonies and dependencies outside Europe (especially Turkey, North and Central Africa, the West Indies, South Asia, and Indonesia). This, of course, brought an even more explosive mix of race and cultural diversity into the fractious continent (Castles and Miller 2009).

A historical ground map to European population movements – breathless as this sketch is – is necessary for any discussion about the place of migration today in the making of a European identity. It is not an easy map to capture (King 2002). Conventional post-colonial and guest worker immigration was supposed to have ended in the 1970s, leaving only limited channels of family reunification and asylum as entry points for migration. Immigrant populations were supposed to have settled and integrated as nationals and citizens, turning more or less culturally homogenous national societies into reluctantly multicultural ones.

The 1980s, and especially 1990s, have changed all this again (Baumgartl and Favell 1995; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2012). A wave of ‘new migrations’ has mixed up the continent once more (Koser and Lutz 1998). A globalising economy has liberalised post-industrial societies, leading to a new dual service economy driven largely by a demand for cheap foreign labour (Piore 1979; Sassen 2001). Global transportation systems have facilitated movement to Europe from increasingly diversified and unpredictable sources (Held et al. 1999). European
Assimilation and integration are the two leading concepts referring to the process of settlement, interaction with the host society, and social change that follows immigration. Both are strongly contested terms politically, with shifting meanings, yet they have enjoyed a comeback in public policy debate and scholarly work in recent years. In this chapter, I offer a dictionary style definition and summary of the basic literature before going on in the following chapter to do a reflexive analysis and critique of the field of comparative integration research in a European context.

As sociological concepts, assimilation and integration have their roots in a Durkheimian style functionalist sociology: in which society is imagined as a complex, ‘organic’ bounded whole, made up of differentiated parts, but held together by shared abstract values and dominant mainstream norms of behaviour. Assimilation and integration are, thus, abstract, performative concepts pointing towards the unifying cohesion that functionalist theories posit is necessary for any society to achieve – via the socialisation of its members – in order for it to be said to work properly. Applied to research, the concepts were popularised by the Chicago school of urban sociology in the early twentieth century, before becoming familiar terms in public policy debates about the consequences of immigration and the challenge of diversity in hitherto (seemingly) unified societies. Both terms also promote a slippery metaphorical link between the social processes they describe and mathematical and/or biological theories that describe processes in the natural world using the same terms. Although applicable to any country of immigration, they are concepts that have been most developed, along rather distinct lines, in the USA and Western Europe.

**Assimilation in the USA**

Assimilation is the more commonly used term in the USA. It is one pole in the debate over the degree to which new immigrants can and should strive to resemble average American middle class (and above) norms and behaviour as the path to successful settlement in the society. The most original or root important theoretical formulation of how assimilation works in American society is the work of Gordon (1964). He distinguished between various dimensions of assimilation in American society, identifying the need for structural assimilation – into the labour and housing markets, as well as language and education – as the most

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important element in immigrant success, ahead of racial, cultural or moral (value) assimilation. Although a neutral typology, his framework is often equated (wrongly) with the conservative argument that new immigrants must conform to the norms and values of the dominant white majority in order to be accepted.

The idea of successful immigrant assimilation is clearly still today a vibrant part of the myth of the ‘American dream’. Yet assimilationist assumptions about how America works as a society have led to numerous critiques, proposing a more differentialist or multiculturalist view of society. In these, various minority or subordinate groups are viewed as able to assert their own cultural autonomy or distinctiveness from the white mainstream as a means to get ahead in American society. This became an important position in the multiculturalist debates that have raged in the USA since the success of the civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s.

However, the term has enjoyed a comeback in recent years in response to heightened concern about the separatism latent in multiculturalist positions. It has been recognised that some set of shared norms and values are a likely precondition for the success of a genuinely pluralist nation of immigrants. Scholars have also sought to rehabilitate the term in the light of the clearly diverse (or ‘segmented’) success rates (or social mobility, see Gans 1992) of new immigrants from around the world since US immigration policy reforms in the 1960s. Arguing that the concept need not be equated with the discredited white majority bias of earlier uses, Alba and Nee (1997; 2003) have laid out an impressive research program documenting the continued importance of historically established patterns of assimilation to middle class residential, educational and occupational trajectories as the crucial precondition for the success of new immigrants in American society. Coming from a more multiculturalist position, Portes and associates (i.e. Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001) have also used the term prominently to signal how less successful new migrant groups with less ‘white’ racial or cultural origins often follow a path of ‘downward assimilation’ to resemble the social profile of inner city African American populations. A key part of this story has been an economic context in which the more stable industrial employment that immigrants used to seek has been replaced by far more precarious and badly paid opportunities in the new service industries.

All of these theories continue to adhere to an essentially functionalist vision of American society, in which immigrant success or failure is charted against a set of taken-for-granted, mainstream American (white) middle- or upper-class norms, bounded by the notion of America society as a wholly self-contained unit of social processes. There is thus little or no space here for a more transnational perspective on the social ties and networks of immigrants, in which their complicated lives embody social structures that can span two or more continents, economically, culturally and politically. Moreover, the mainstream into which they are said to merge is never clearly defined, despite the fact that any majority of the population is likely to be riven by cultural, regional, political and value differences. Beyond this, the assimilationist picture also renders invisible what is distinctly national about the characteristics of the American population. In the USA, folk ideology sees the mainstream culture rather blindly as a multi-national, universal one,
whereas in fact assimilation entails the complete re-nationalisation of diverse immigrants into a new, nationally-specific American culture, which is far from universal in its attitudes about patriotism and cultural identity (Waldinger and FitzGerald 2004). Nationalisation, in other words, also entails differentiation from other nationalities, i.e. from ‘foreigners’. Hyphenated US identities (Italian-American, Danish-American, and so on) have rarely preserved any more than an ersatz element of the original homeland national culture in the face of the extraordinarily coercive power of the host society to absorb and transform newcomers into ‘Americans’, particularly by the third generation (what is referred to as ‘straight-line assimilation’). And, although in practice the new immigrant American identity has been open to all who embrace the American dream, there is still a lingering sense of exclusion hanging over the possibly ‘un-American’ tendencies of more recent immigrants (Huntington 2004): for example, Islamic middle Easterners, whose culture and values – like the ‘communists’ before them – are seen now to be unquestionably compatible; or the vast population of Spanish speaking Mexicans and other Latinos, who seem able to create a semi-autonomous, bilingual society of their own in the big cities of the American South-West, which is located in a space of flows and transactions that stretches out South across the US border. These problems are shared by the rare examples of assimilationist studies in Europe – most notably in France (Tribalat et al. 1996), which I discuss in more detail in the next chapter – in which immigrants’ cultural and social features are evaluated in relation to average French norms, generalised from so-called français de souche (French citizens born of French origin families) said to embody the universalist aspirations of French society. Such claims appear absurd when they are made about culturally specific, smaller European nations; it is only the sheer scale of the USA that enables it to be so blind to its own nation-building ideology.

Integration in Europe

The term, integration, however, is by far the more popular concept in a European context, including France. In recent years it has been invoked prominently in public policy debates, and high level policy formulations in Britain, France, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Austria and elsewhere (see detailed discussion in the following chapter). In policy debates, it generally refers to a ‘middle way’ between coercive conformism to national norms and values, on the one hand, and the threat of separatism, seen as latent in the excessive preservation of non-European cultures, on the other. In the USA, the term integration was mainly used as a goal in the black civil rights movement, in opposition to the segregation of schools and public services. Scientifically speaking, there are no satisfactory core definitions, despite the growing number of national and cross-national projects. Banton (2001) refers to integration as a ‘treacherous metaphor’, which alludes to a two-way accommodation of host and immigrant groups, but offers no clear criteria for operationalisation and measurement. Crucially, this is because there is no clear measurement of how integrated (or ‘organic’) modern societies are to begin to with.
Chapter Eight

The New Face of East-West Migration in Europe

The enlargements of the EU eastwards in May 2004 and January 2007 signalled a geo-political shift in post-1989 Europe, that – in terms of the migration and mobility of populations – poses the biggest demographic change in Europe since the devastation and flux at the end of the Second World War.\(^1\) The Cold War was finally over, and Europe united again – with new Central and East European citizens able to access now, or in the near future, the same free movement rights that have been enjoyed for years by West European citizens of the EU. Freedom of movement of persons from the new Member States remains a contentious issue, and some borders remain in place: not all temporary accession limitations to free movement are yet down. West European states have shown themselves politically to be far less keen on the movement of people westwards than they are on the gold rush of Western capital to the East. Yet one by one, formal restrictions on the free movement of East Europeans have been given up, in many cases enabling legal regularisation of migration and mobility that has long been occurring in practice. Borders have come down, and a new East-West migration system has been established in the continent.

These dramatic changes represent a new frontier in European migration research. Most of the studies completed before the enlargements focused on large-scale demographic trends or their political framing (for overviews, see Wallace and Stola 2001; Favell and Hansen 2002; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005). Less has been done on the ethnographic micro-level: on the lives, experiences, networks and social forms that this new migration in Europe has taken. As was stressed earlier in this volume, fresh research is called for on the ‘human face’ of this migration as others, and this is being answered in large part by a new generation of Central and East European researchers, themselves often academic migrants pursuing education and careers in the West. In this introduction to the subject, I offer a framework and

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overview for understanding the importance of this new research, emphasising two key points. The first is that our tried and tested narrative and models of post-war immigration in Europe – the standard discussions of immigration, integration and citizenship, based on post-colonial, guest worker and asylum models, and historical distinctions between pre- and post-1973 trends – is finished. The second is that the new East-West migration finally provides scholars with a European context comparable to the Mexican-US scenario that has inspired the largest and most sophisticated body of migration theory and research available in the social sciences. East-West migration can be read through these theories, providing a rich empirical material that will enable the development of better, more comparative views on the driving forces of international migration, as well as the role of free movement and migration in regional integration processes taking place around the globe today.

Systematising what we can learn from this body of theory and research, I evaluate four different hypotheses that might best account for the new East-West migration system in Europe. The dominant trend in Europe appears to be towards the emergence of a more regionalised system, in which West European societies come to rely on East European movers to fill secondary labour market needs in the service economy – in an exploitative fashion – as well as encouraging a more effective racial or ethnically-based exclusion of migrants from the South or further afield.

**Political and policy context**

Policy advocacy on East-West migration, as well as most of the credible demographic and economic scholarship, has consistently suggested that the West has little to fear from post-enlargement migration. Early scholarship in the days after the Berlin Wall came down – usually by German or Austrian scholars – did suggest that there was a huge pent-up demand for East-West migration that might provoke a flood to the West (Hönkopp 1991; Fassmann and Hintermann 1997; Bauer and Zimmerman 1999). Much of this research was based on surveys of migration intentions among a population recently freed to dream about being part of the West. Later scholars rightly pointed out the unreliability of this work. A much better guide to future enlargements were the past enlargements of Southern and Mediterranean states (Kupiszewski 2002; Wallace 2002). The accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece did not lead to floods of new migrants, but manageable flows, positive trends in terms of trade and development in the new Southern Member States, and high levels of return migration. The integration of these nations into the European fold in fact stands as an unqualified success in the history of the EU – as well as clear inspiration to later enlargements.

The consensus among policy makers aware of the underlying demographics – particularly reflected in the most influential policy advocacy in Brussels (ECAS 2005, 2006; ACA 2006) – is that Europe as a whole has benefited from a greater degree of manageable East-West movement. Not only has Western Europe received a new influx of highly educated, talented or (in any case) ambitious East Europeans, driven by the very positive selection mechanisms working in the European context (Borjas 1999). These migration trends are also quite different from the post-colonial,
guest worker and asylum immigration that has proven such a long-term political issue of contention in Europe. East European migrants once accession is complete are in fact regional ‘free movers’ not immigrants; and with the borders open, they have been much more likely to engage in temporary circular and transnational mobility, governed by the ebb and flow of economic demand, than by long-term permanent immigration and asylum seeking. Many East Europeans in any case were able to move and work in the West before 2004; the enlargement regularised a situation well established in de facto practice on the ground.

For all the good arguments to encourage open borders and free movement, the political calculation on these issues has pointed to a different rationality. Particularly in the ongoing aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, there has been great electoral reward to be had by populist politicians using the ‘threat’ of open doors eastwards as a tool for berating the impact of the EU, in particular the liberalisation of West European labour markets or employment legislation. The ugly French debate about the ‘Polish plumber’ during the EU constitutional vote of spring 2005 was but the start of this phenomenon. Little matter that the handful of Polish plumbers in France have been outnumbered vastly by their Polish counterparts who chose Britain instead, and who went on to dominate this sector in London or Manchester – or apparently that the British economy during this period did much better than the French on the back of this informal workforce. It was the failed Bolkestein directive on freedom of movement of services (2006) that opened the spectre of European nation states no longer being able to control employment legislation on their own territory. France baulked at the possibility of the rights of workers or the rules of the working week, in certain sectors now coming under the jurisdiction of say, Polish or British law, both of which are more lax. Critics call this competitive imbalance in the system ‘social dumping’, and ‘a race to the bottom’. In reality, though, what is not harmonised (and thereby regulated) by the EU with planned legislation, may instead simply get accomplished by market-driven forces, when they are able freely post workers within Europe wherever and whenever in the absence of meaningful border controls.

As regards the members that joined in 2004, West European nations one by one accepted the inevitable and brought down transitional barriers to freedom of movement for new Member States after much lobbying from the European Commission. Initially only three countries opened their borders: Ireland, Sweden, and Britain. All reaped economic benefits from the inflows that followed, that

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2. This point is controversial, not least for policy makers. A report for the Rowntree Foundation (Spencer et al. 2007), based on interviews with East Europeans resident in the UK before and after enlargement, was presented by the British press as evidence that more of them were now intending to settle in Britain than expected. In fact, only around a quarter stated this intention, the others still engaging in dominantly circular and temporary mobility patterns. The economic crisis and increasing harassment with cross-border travel may well have persuaded more East Europeans to attempt longer term settlement – in case the doors close again. Intentions in migration are notoriously unreliable, and the presentation says nothing about the everyday transnational practices that have been made easier by the regularisation processes, as documented in the work cited by Garapich (2008) and Anghel (2013). The Rowntree report’s interpretation was also influenced by the heavily normative integrationist perspective of the COMPAS (Oxford) researchers involved.